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The Politics of Redistribution with Growth
The 'target group' approach
Colin Leys
The main aim of Redistribution with Growth
(RwG) is to offer "analytical tools" which will
help to explain how it is that the poorest third
of the populations of the Third World have
received "little or no benefit" from the growth
of their countries' economies in the last lO to 15
years; and on the basis of this explanation, to
indicate new kinds of policies which could reduce
their poverty in the future. Both these aims are
decisively affected by the report's political
assumptions.
These assumptions may be summarized as fol-
lows. First, it is assumed that the Third World
countries in question will continue to be pre-
dominantly capitalist societies, in which the dis-
tribution of income is primarily determined by
the distribution of ownership of productive
capital:
. the income of any household is derived
from a variety of assets: land, privately owned
capital, access to public capital goods, and
human capital embodying various degrees of
skills" (p. 43).
(Although "access to public capital goods" is
included in this list, it soon becomes evident that
this is not thought of as likely to be an important
determinant of household income.)
Second, the report assumes that political power
in these societies will continue to be based pri-
marily on the private ownership of capital. This
comes out most clearly in chapter 3 which dis-
cusses the conditions under which the sort of
policies envisaged by the report might be prac-
ticable:
in espousing the general principle of
redistributing the benefits of growth, an essen-
tially political judgment was made, which is
thematic to the volume as a whole. This is that
intervention which alters the distribution of the
increment to the overall capital stock and in-
come will arouse less hostility from the rich than
transfers which bite into their existing assets
and incomes" (p. 56).
Third, there is a related but distinct assumption
that social revolution ought to be avoided. As an
example of this we may take another passage
from chapter 2, where it is argued that although
redistribution of land is essential in rural areas,
this is the only major form of asset redistribution
which is really necessary or desirable.
"Beyond this essential minimum, a vigorous
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policy of investment reallocation in a rapidly
growing economy may well be a more effective
way of increasing the productive capacity of
the poor than redistribution from the existing
system of assets, which is likely to have a high
cost in social and political disruption" (p. 49).
Or consider this passage from chapter 3, in which
it is argued that land redistribution is not only
essential for rural income redistribution, but may
actually reinforce the existing structure of poli-
tical power:
there is the general thesis that once the
peasantry's immediate demands for land are
met, it will become a conservative force, a
bulwark of the (new) status quo. Provided the
process is controlled, therefore, land reform
can do much to alleviate the lot of the poor
without tearing apart the fabric of society"
(p. 61).
In other words, a high value is attached to pre-
serving the existing social and political arrange-
ments, the existing 'fabric of society'.
In short, the report is a highly political document
and both its analysis and its recommendations
must be read in the light of this fact.
The determinants of 'poverty'
According to the model put forward in RwG the
income of the 'poverty groups' to be found in
the Third World may be thought of as being
determined by their lack of assets, i.e. land,
privately owned capital, access to public capital,
and human capital (skills). The report's theory of
income determination departs, it is claimed, from
that of both classical economics and Marxism,
and neo-classical economics, in stressing that in
the Third World most of those who are really
poor are simply unable to have access to capital
with which to work, either as wage labourers or
as independent, self-employed producers owning
or controlling the necessary modicum of the
means of production. Consequently the report
focuses primarily on various policies of investment
which would bring together the means of produc-
tion and the poor either by bringing the poor into
an expanded labour force as employees of labour-
intensive small firms, or by enabling them to
become productive as small farmers or artisans
of some sort.
But the report does not include in its theory of
the determination of the income of 'poverty
groups' the structural or political forces which in
turn determine the existing distribution of assests.
For instance, it does not include the structures of
political, legal and religious control which under-
write the appropriation of surplus from, say,
small farmers, and not only prevent them from
accumulating capital but, in many areas, force
them to disinvest progressively until their initial
stock of capital is largely exhausted. In the same
way it considers as a determinant of the income
of the poor the wages earned both in large-scale,
'modern' firms, and in small local firms, without
considering the systems of anti-union legislation
and political control which have so often helped
to keep wages at a level below that required to
maintain a family. A somewhat wider view
appears in chapter 8, where the income-distribu-
tion effects of investment by multinational cor-
porations is briefly considered, but by and large
the global effects of the foreign ownership of
capital are not matched by any very clear strategic
proposals.
What all this means is that a rather narrowly
conceived model of income determination defines
a fairly narrowly restricted area of strategic
action. This is not to say that the pursuit of the
policies sketched within the restricted area would
not tend to redistribute income in favour of the
poor. But (j) so many of the major determinants
of income distribution are left out that one must
feel grave doubts that the policies proposed
would, even if pursued, in themselves prove
sufficient to make significant impact; and (ii)
many of these same omitted determinants of
income will also operate to prevent even the res-
tricted policies envisaged in RwG from being
adopted in the first place.
Because of the presupposition that poverty must
be alleviated without disturbing the political
power of private capital, it follows that the job
must be primarily conceived of as something done
for 'the poor', by (or with the consent of) 'the
rich' (acting from enlightened self-interest, or
fear).
This is summed up by the term 'target groups'
which runs throughout the whole report.
The term 'group' as it is used here has nothing
in common with the concex of group as it is
normally used in sociology or political science.
A 'target group' is not a body of people acting
consciously together; on the contrary, it denotes
merely a category of people on whose incomes a
given redistributive measure should have a similar
effect, through operating on a common cause of
their low income level (e.g. all landless rural
labourers, all unskilled unemployed in the towns).
With this concept, therefore, we are far removed
from any conception of change in which the
activities and the consciousness of 'the poor'
themselves are really expected to play a leading
part. It follows naturally from this that the
authors explicitly reject the concept of class as
relevant to the explanation or the abolition of
poverty. They point out that those people who
are poorest in Third World countries fall into
various different classes, some members of which
are less poor, and which in any case do not
always form the necessary alliances to make a
successful bid for political power. From this they
seem to conclude that it follows that the poor can
only be helped by being thought of in terms of a
number of 'target groups' (or as I think it might
be better to call them, 'object categories').
This conclusion, however, does not seem to me to
follow. Because the poor belong to different
classes, and because these classes have often not
succeeded in developing effective alliances, or
indeed effective political consciousness and
political organisation, it does not follow that the
poor are more likely to be helped by being recon-
ceptualized as the possible recipients of redistri-
bution at the hands of those who are currently
dominating and oppressing them. Without in any
way under-rating the difficulties confronting the
workers' and peasants' class struggle in the Third
World, one may still be inclined to think that it
offers a great deal more likelihood of relieving
poverty than anything else, and even that there is
no serious alternative.
The point at issue here is well illustrated by a
discussion in chapter 3 of the report on how
'the poor' may be 'mobilized' to support a redis-
tributive programme of the kind it advocates.
The impression this conveys of 'the poor' is of an
apathetic and suspicious mass, deeply divided
by notions of tribe, caste, religion and so on, who
must be mobilized from above to give their
support to redistributive programmes, and to help
implement them. It is even proposed that inter-
vention from above might take the form of
official sponsorship of some sort of 'trade union'
of the poor. Now this seems to me absurd, if
not positively reactionary. I am not saying that
there are no passive, alienated, politically frag-
mented and manipulated peasant and worker
masses. But we need to remind ourselves that
there have also been powerful, and in some
cases large-scale and enduring examples of the
mobilization of the impoverished masses. In a
few cases, this has led to successes and major
redistributive changesnotably in China, north
Vietnam, and Cuba. In far more cases in the
Third World so far, it has led to repressions and
defeats. It needs to be pointed out that those
who have tried to mobilize the poor have often
been killed or jailed. The report talks about
'mobilizing the poor' while apparently forgetting
that in Indonesia several hundred thousand Com-
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munist Party supporters were murdered for taking
part in such a mobilization.
In India the Telengan peasant movement, in the
Philippines the Huk movement, in south Vietnam
the Viet Cong and other opposition organizations
have been suppressed with varying degrees of
success. In southern Africa the liberation move-
ments have been suppressed in the Republic, and
in the Portuguese colonies have been opposed
by the Portuguese army with equal ruthlessness
with NATO support; Mondlane and Cabrai were
murdered. In Brazil, systematic murder is appar-
ently now used as a normal political weapon
against urban or rural revolutionaries, or those
suspected of associating with them. All this is
not meant to paint a lurid picture, but only to
correct what seems to be a strangely unreal
impression of the so-called poor of the Third
World still awaiting the call to action on their
own behalf. The fact remains that in Africa,
Latin America and South-East Asia most govern-
ments closely control political activity and harass
or suppress 'radical' parties, where political
organization is not banned altogether. A question
which the authors of RwG must answer, I think,
is this: in how many of the 'considerable range
of societies for which the (RwG) strategy is at
least plausible' is it possible today to organize a
radical socialist party? And where it is not, what
can be meant by mobilizing the poor?
Pessimism and indeterminancy
A striking feature of the report's analysis of the
possibilities of political action of the kind it pro-
poses is that it is pessimistic about the actual
number of countries in which a redistributive
programme is at all likely to be adopted, about
the number in which, if adopted, it would be
pursued with any vigour, and finally, about the
chances of even a vigorous effort succeeding. (I
think this is a fair comment on the conclusions of
the chapter, which are a fair summary of the
conclusions reached in the text). Secondly, it is
rather inconclusive where it is not pessimistic. For
instance, if land is redistributed to the rural poor
the process of redistribution may make them and
other strata of the working class more revolution-
ary, but on the other hand, once the rural poor
have got land they may become conservative.
Education may benefit the poor, but may be more
likely to benefit capitalists. The rich elite may
adopt redistributive programmes to avert revo-
lution, or to increase their own future income, or
to win internal battles with other rich groups;
or they may be more afraid of the poor and
consolidate their alliance with other rich groups
and even with foreign capital and foreign govern-
ments to resist any significant redistributive
change.
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lt could be argued that inconclusiveness is un-
avoidable in a chapter which deals with political
strategy, without doing so in a particular historical
and geographical setting. There can by definition
be no such thing as a strategy, let alone suitable
tactics, for all situations. This is true, but it raises
the question of the nature of the enterprise under-
taken in chapter 3; and in fact, it seems to me that
both the pessimism and the inconclusiveness
spring from a dilemma in which the whole con-
ception of RwG is caught. In essence, this is that
in a capitalist society the distribution of political
power reflects, and also underwrites, the distri-
bution of economic power. The distribution is not
static; but in the absence of a theory which will
show how the distribution of both can be altered
progressively in favour of those who are poor or
weak, any general package of measures for re-
distributing economic power alone (a package
hitherto not adopted) seems either obviously
unrealistic, leading to pessimism, or is at best an
unknown and unknowable quantity, leading to
inconclusiveness.
The dilemma of the approach of RwG is illus-
trated most strikingly by two highly contrasting
passages. One deals with education. According
to chapter 3, giving education to the poor is likely
to be a feasible redistributive policy, partly
because the rich are less likely to notice the sacri-
fice it costs them than they are with other redis-
tributive measures, and partly because they may
see it as helping to make their own dominance
legitimate, while in fact not threatening it (p. 62).
The trouble with this policy however, is that (as
the authors recognise) without a change in the
reward structure, and given the discrimination
within the school system in favour of rich chil-
dren, it is not necessarily very redistributive. On
the other hand, land reform is seen as not only
directly redistributive, but also as essential
if other redistributive policies adopted in rural
areas are not to benefit the rural rich as
much as or more than the rural poor. This
measure however, is nothing if not radical. In
one place (p. 135) it is even envisaged as a
measure which "breaks the power of large farmers
and the rural elite". The problem here is the
opposite one: if in a given situation a programme
of land reform which will break the power of the
rural rich has not so far been adopted, what does
RwG envisage will put it on the political agenda?
Without a general theory of social change no
answer can be given to this question.
In the last analysis, the dilemma in which the
report's discussion of political action is caught
is really that of the report as a whole: i.e., the
recipe of a reformist redistribution of wealth and
income within a predominantly capitalist system is
inept in the situation which now prevails through-
out much of the Third World, and has been
largely superseded by the political polarization
which has already occurred there. However, even
if one does not accept this view, the problem
remains that RwG lacks a theory which would
relate economic and political forces to each other.
It explicitly rejects Marxist theory, in which the
nature of the economy and the distribution of
income are related dynamically to the nature of
politics and distribution of political power, but
does not substitute any alternative theory.' To put
the matter more concretely, there is a recom-
mendation in chapter 8 on 'International Dimen-
sions' that aid should be made more conditional
on governments adopting redistributive or
'poverty-focused' policies; but other than this, no
general reason is advanced for thinking that
regimes which have not already adopted the
orientation of RwG will be more likely to do so
in future.
The politics of the 'index of welfare'
In chapter 2 of the report an index of economic
performance is put forward which, unlike the
conventional measure of GNP, would be weighted
in favour of increments in the income of the
poor. The report points out that the methodology
involved in this is 'politically neutral', since the
weights used can be chosen "to fit the preferences
of a given society" (p. xvi). Just how the pre-
ferences of a 'given society' might be determined
is not discussed. What is interesting, however, is
the way the political assumptions of the report
affect its own discussion and illustration of the
use of such an index, converting it from an
apparently 'neutral' analytic tool to an element in
the legitimization of a political programme.
As an example we may take a passage from chap-
ter 2, where the report is discussing the fact that
its model of income determination involves
distinguishing small-scale from larger-scale
capitalists:
"Small scale employers tend to use production
techniques that can more readily employ the
less-educated labour from the poverty groups.
Furthermore, income from their capital also
goes largely to the middle-income group and
should be given more weight in social policy
than the higher incomes of the large employ-
ers" (p. 46).
The second of these propositions deserves
further consideration. lt seems to say that small-
scale capitalists' incomes should be given more
weight in social policy than large scale capitalists'
J For a lucid formal discussion of the problem which RwG
has thus imposed on itself. see G. Arrighi's Introduction to
The Political Economy of Rhodesia. Mouton, Paris and The
Hague, 1967.
incomes, apparently because this income goes to
the 'middle income group'. h..,w has the report
arrived at the idea that it sLuld be an object of
social policy to increase their incomes? The object
of redistribution is clearly stated at the beginning
of the report to be the reduction of poverty, and
the report does not argue that small capitalists are
poor, at least in their national contexts. So why
should their incomes be increased as part of a
policy aimed at alleviating poverty?
One can only speculate that, for the authors of
RwG, alleviating poverty within the framework
of a capitalist economy is seen to require a
general policy of fostering small-scale labour-
intensive enterprizes. Although the effects of
such a policy are expected to benefit the poor,
they will also make a section of the rich richer.
While the category of small-scale capitalists may
include many businessmen and farmers who are
only moderately prosperous, it naturally also
includes many who are rich by any standards, and
it is hard to conceive of ways in which a policy
designed to foster the former group would not
also favour the latter. However, these implications
are less apparent when the policy in question is
described in formal and general terms, in terms
of income groups, target groups, and with refer-
ence to the formal properties of the proposed
analytic model. And what this particular example
illustrates is the way the arbitrary character of the
'index of performance' which forms part of
that model quickly tends to be endowed with
absolute value.
In the discussion of the index (pp. 40-41) it is
pointed out that one system of weighting would
be to assign weight almost exclusively to growth
of the incomes of the lowest income groups. If
this were done, it would be the same as a decision
to give virtually no weight in social policy to the
incomes of the middle income group, let alone to
small-scale capitalists. But in fact the 'poverty
weighted' index illustrated in RwG (p. 42) assigns
positive weights to the growth of incomes of all
income groups, and 30 per cent of the total
weight to the middle income groups. In other
words, the index illustrated in RwG (which
quickly comes to he labelled an index of 'welfare')
is consistent with the political programme of
backing the small capitalist.
RwG offers no explicit justification for its poli-
tical standpoint. There is, however, an implicit
justification which recurs throughout its pages,
to the effect that its strategy is simply designed to
do something about the Third World's poor given
a 'recognition' of what is likely to be the situation
in most Third World countries in the foreseeable
future. Thus it accepts that "large scale transfers
of income are politically unlikely in developing
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countries" (p. 39) and that "political resistance to
policies of asset distribution makes this approach
unlikely to succeed on any large scale in most
countries" (p. 49), and so on. The approach of
RwG might then be represented as simply a
realistic and humane response to the improba-
bility that radical changes will bring about radical
improvements in the lot of the poor.
There are several reasons why this position seems
to me untenable, particularly in a document con-
cerned with policy and prepared largely within
and published for the World Bank. First, no
statistical meaning can be attached to these
apparent statements of probability; one can
equally well argue that the stability and per-
manence of many regimes in the Third World
today are, in the medium run at least, threatened
by many incalculable factors arising in the course
of the political struggles which are going on there.
Second, the Bank is an agency of governments
the most important of which throw their con-
siderable influence against such radical changes in
the interests of preserving private capital. The
'likelihood' of radical changes in the Third World
is clearly inseparable from the policies of these
governments; the 'likelihood' of success for the
UP in Chile, to take the most recent example, was
notoriously not independent of the policies of he
US government, US multinational companies, and
the loans policy of the Bank. In view of this, and
of the Bank's leading role in the formulation of
policies towards the Third World by its member
governments generally, the report's ostensible
'judgment' that radical social changes are 'un-
likely' in the Third World assumes a good deal
of the character of a programme, rather than a
prognosis. And to the extent that the perspective
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of 'redistribution with growth' is widely accepted,
a general programme directed against radical
change will have been accepted in the guise of a
new 'technical' approach to 'development'.
Finally, we should also consider briefly a more
general question: why is the report so exclusively
concerned with poverty? Poverty is certainly
important, but a concern with poverty virtually to
the exclusion of the social structures which give
rise to it is unacceptable. The condition of the
masses in the Third World is not purely a matter of
material want, but also of subordination, oppres-
sion, exploitation and disregard, which are at least
as important, but about these RwG is wholly
silent. It is as if the identification of 'development'
with 'growth' having been finally exploded, we
were now being invited to identify development
with 'growth plus improvement in the incomes of
the poor'; and in so doing, to continue to disre-
gard the growing body of opinion throughout
the Third World which holds a quite different
conception of what 'development' would really
imply for the mass of the people. And in this
context, the question should also be asked, why
has the World Bank become so exclusively pre-
occupied with poverty now as evidenced by this
study and also by official statements of Bank
policy. According to the report, although the fact
of poverty has been obvious from the first, it has
only recently become clear that economic growth
by itself may not alleviate poverty within a
reasonable time. While this is no doubt true, one
cannot help feeling that this is a somewhat
academic way of putting the matter; and that it
is the political crises in one underdeveloped
country after another which have produced the
new preoccupation with poverty.
